The agreement also stipulates that the Taliban and the Afghan government will begin “dialogue and negotiations” on March 10, 2020, a date that has already passed. The specific themes of this “dialogue and negotiations” are not specified, but it is believed that they include at least the role of the Taliban in a future Afghan government, the role of Islamic law in the Afghan constitution, the protection and rights of women and other minorities, and ultimately the leadership of the country. A precursor to intra-Afghan negotiations, the agreement stipulates that the United States agrees to “cooperate with all parties concerned” on the release of combat and political prisoners. The agreement stipulated that the Afghan government would release 5,000 Taliban prisoners and the Taliban 1,000 Afghan prisoners by March 10, 2020. The release of the prisoners is described as a “confidence-building” to fuel discussions between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Intra-Afghan negotiations leading to tangible peace and a credible power-sharing agreement in Afghanistan face real challenges. Problems include concerns related to prisoner exchanges; the composition of a future Afghan State and Government and the reintegration of the Taliban into the Afghan security forces; and the internal cohesion of the Taliban and the Afghan government, and whether the Taliban are really engaged in an intra-Afghan peace process or use their participation as a bargaining chip to achieve their own goals. Treaties and agreements on the difficult issue of security assurances and enforcement mechanisms traditionally belong to the realm of interaction between States and not to the realm of agreement between a State and a non-State actor, particularly one that has long been demonized as a terrorist. This finding is all the more important to take into consideration as it contains provisions providing for “a plan for the prompt release of combat and political prisoners as a confidence-building measure” and insists that those released be “committed to the responsibilities of this Agreement”. During the “war on terror,” lawyers representing the U.S. government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) threw a lot of ink on the definition of legal and illegal combatants and prisoners of war. This agreement seems to conveniently erase all memories of this lawfare, as it refers to the release of “combat and political prisoners”. Nevertheless, negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban on the release of the prisoners began as planned on March 10, 2020.
The Taliban resumed offensive operations against the Afghan army and police on March 3, 2020, carrying out attacks in Kunduz and Helmand provinces. [45] On March 4, the United States carried out airstrikes on Taliban fighters in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan. [46] In the 45 days following the agreement (between March 1 and April 15, 2020), the Taliban carried out more than 4,500 attacks in Afghanistan, an increase of more than 70% compared to the same period last year. [47] More than 900 members of the Afghan security forces were killed during this period, up from about 520 at the same time last year. Due to a significant decrease in the number of offensives and airstrikes carried out by Afghan and US forces against the Taliban, Taliban casualties fell to 610 during the reporting period, from about 1,660 at the same time last year. Pentagon spokesman Jonathan Hoffman said that although the Taliban had stopped carrying out attacks against US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, the violence was still “unacceptably high” and “not conducive to a diplomatic solution.” He added: “We have continued to carry out defensive attacks to defend our partners in the region and we will continue to do so.” [47] The future of peace in Afghanistan will depend on how major regional powers, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan and the European Union, act in ways that could undermine or advance the peace process. Tensions between the major powers – the United States, China, the European Union, India and Russia – and others are rising, which could affect the outcome of the Afghan peace process as each power seeks to protect its own interests in the region. In addition, the deterioration of bilateral relations between two or more regional powers (e.g. B, between the United States and Iran) could also undermine cooperative efforts or otherwise influence the outcome of intra-Afghan negotiations. Either way, given the short time left, intra-Afghan negotiations are unlikely to produce clear results by the end of April 2021 – the date set in the agreement for a full US withdrawal.
But this withdrawal is linked to certain conditions of the agreement that were probably not met. On the 27th. In March 2020, the Afghan government announced the formation of a 21-member negotiating team for the peace talks.